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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court's concern with the constitutional rights of
an accused in the back room of the police station is obviously
legitimate. Roscoe Pound recognized in 1934 the problem caused
by incommunicado grilling and suggested the solution achieved in
Escobedo regarding right to counsel. He also submitted that there
should be an express provision for a legal examination of suspected
of accused persons before a magistrate as well as a provision for
taking down evidence so as to guarantee accuracy. 24 J. CraM. L. &
C. 1014, 1017 (1934). If these safeguards are to be incorporated
in police investigatory methods, they apparently will get there
through judicial determination of constitutional rights of the ac-
cused. Whether Dufour is a proper extension of Escobedo and
whether the right to counsel becomes operative only upon request
are only two of many determinations which should be reached in
delineating the proper balance between the accuser and the
accused.
Lester Clay Hess, Jr.
Constitutional Law-Conscientious Objectors
Daniel Andrew Seeger, Arno Sascha Jakobson and Forrest Britt
Peter were convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the
armed forces as required by federal law. 50 U.S.C. § 456 (j)
(1958). This law exempts from military service persons who by
reason of religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed
to any participation in war. The act defines religious training and
belief as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views or a merely personal code."
The defendants expressed varied beliefs. Seeger stated that his
belief was a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed."
He did not, however, disavow a belief in relation to a Supreme
Being. Jakobson said that he believed in a "Supreme Being" who
was the "Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately respons-
ible for the existence of" and who was "the Supreme Reality" of
which "[Tihe existence of man is the result." Peter stated that the
source of his conviction was "our democratic American culture
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with its values derived from the western culture and philosophical
tradition." He supposed "[Y]ou could call that a belief in a Supreme
Being or God."
The Court held that all of these beliefs fell within the purview of
the act. In so doing, the Court established that the test of belief
in relation to a Supreme Being is "whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption." United States v. Seeger, 85
Sup. Ct. 850 (1965).
By its decision, the Court appears to have stripped the cloak of
narrow construction from the interpretation of a Supreme Being to
embrace the expanding concepts of modern religion. In doing so,
the Court avoided the defendants' contentions that the section does
not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors and, as a result,
it discriminates between different forms of religious expression in
violation of the first amendment's establishment and free exercise
clauses and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The Court, however, in sidestepping the constitutional issue, un-
dertook to define a Supreme Being. Mr. Justice Clark posed this
question, "Does the term 'Supreme Being' . . . mean the orthodox
God or the broader concept of a power or being, or a faith 'to which
all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately depend-
ent'?" He concluded that the test of belief must be a belief that
is parallel to that of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.
United States v. Seeger, supra at 854.
The necessity of exempting certain classes of citizens from military
service first came to be recognized on the federal level during the
Civil War. 12 Stat. 731 (1863). Prior to that time, the states were
left to cope with this problem. The Civil War Act provided for
the exemption of a conscientious objector if he could either procure
a substitute or pay a 300 dollars penalty. 12 Stat. 733 (1863). The
conscientious objector was allowed non-combatant service if he
could establish his membership in a "well-organized religious sect"
which was opposed to war, and if he could prove his individual
opposition to military combat.
The Selective Service Act of World War II dropped the test of
association and assumed a test based upon the individual's religious
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training and belief. 54 Stat. 889 (1940). This test met with varied
application by the courts. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377
(9th Cir. 1964), held that the test did not encompass broad philo-
sophical or sociological beliefs. The Court relied on a dictum from
the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macin-
tosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931), where he stated that "The essence
of religion is belief in relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation."
In 1948, Congress amended the language of the statute and
declared that "religious training and belief' is "an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation but [not including] essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code." 50 U.S.C. § 456 (1958). This clause is essentially the
dictum of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the Macintosh case, with
the exception of the term "Supreme Being" substituted for the term
"God."
To some, the test appeared to become more definitive and strin-
gent with the addition of the term "Supreme Being." However, the
effect was exactly the opposite. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961), held invalid under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment a requirement by the Maryland Constitution that a
notary public declare his belief in the existence of God as part of
his oath of office. The Court stated that the test oath restricted
the area of belief to "one particular sort of believer," thereby im-
posing on the free exercise of the faith of nonbelievers in violation
of the free exercise clause. Torcaso v. Watkins, supra at 495. Thus,
not only was a theistic belief repudiated as essential to religion
within the meaning of the Constitution, but the Court also consid-
ered a belief in the existence of God as nonessential to a religious
belief. As Mr. Justice Black stated, "[A]mong religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered
a belief in the existence of God are Buddism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Torcaso v. Watkins, supra
at 495, n. 11.
Before the instant case reached the Supreme Court, the defendant
Seeger was found to be exempt on a claim that his objections to
war were founded on religious belief and training, even though he
refused to declare a belief in God. The court found that Seeger
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had a faith based on ethical considerations in terms of "moral
responsibility to search for a way to maintain the recognition of
the dignity and worth of the individual, the faith in reason, freedom
and individuality, and the opportunity to improve life for which
democracy stands." United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.
1964).
The Torcaso footnote of Mr. Justice Black and the Seeger case
would thus appear to support the view that a belief in a system of
ultimate moral values that bind the conscience is a form of religious
belief within the meaning of the Constitution and that the grant of
a statutory exemption designed to implement religious liberty must
be broad enough to include such belief. KAuPEB, REIGION Am
=hE CoNsTrtUEoN 30 (1964).
The interpretation by the Court in the instant case is consistent
with the expanding congressional policy of equal treatment to those
whose opposition to military combat is based upon religious beliefs.
The test thus established does not require the local boards and
courts to determine in what religion the registrant believes. The
Court was quick to note that the fact that a religious belief is
incomprehensible to the local boards and courts does not establish
grounds for rejection under the law. The Court also stated that the
real task is to determine whether the beliefs professed are sincerely
held and whether they are religious in the registrants own scheme
of things. United States v. Seeger, supra at 863.
However, it is obvious that some complexity will be encountered
in determining which type of conscientious objectors Congress in-
tended the exemption to apply. As stated previously, the present
law excludes essentially political, sociological or philosophical views,
and a merely personal code.
No great difficulty is experienced with registrants who give
political or sociological reasons for requesting exemption. These
beliefs, even though they may be sincere, are not within the statu-
tory exemption because they are not religious. In Davidson v.
United States, 218 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1954), the court held that a
registrant who denies the existence of a Supreme Being and states
his allegiance to be directed toward humanity as a whole is not
exempt.
The political objector requires a distinction from the conscien-
tious objector. He may be variously classified. One type consists
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of participants in an unorganized political movement seeking to
outlaw conscription through their martyrdom. The other class-
ification includes members of an organized group who seek to
oppose the interests of government, such as the American Com-
munist Party. 36 MINN. L. 1Eiv. 65, 75 (1951). There would be
little question in this case as to their sincerity in their beliefs, but
the element of religion would be negated when applied in the sense
of a belief occupying a place in the life of a Communist parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God.
Perhaps the most difficult problem is that posed by the moral
or ethical objectors. The views of this group which are usually
voiced by a highly intelligent and literate registrant must be re-
jected as being the result of a religious training or belief. Berman
v. United States, supra at 380, stated that the words "religious train-
ing and belief' were embodied in the 1940 statute "for the purpose
of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief or a sincere
devotion to a highly moralistic philosophy and one based on an
individuars belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and
beyond any worldly one . . . ." Congress indicated its preference
to this view by substantially adopting this position in 1948. S. Rzr,.
No. 1268 80th Cong. 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
The decision in the instant case opens the way to a definition of
religion that transcends traditional theism and recognizes a wide
variety of religious beliefs. The ruling also avoids an implication
that a secular ideology must be characterized as religion. This
seems to be consistent and in harmony with the settling principles
more clearly emerging from the Court's interpretation and applica-
tion of the first amendment freedoms.
Frank Cuomo
Criminal Law-Time Limitations in Initiating
Habitual Criminal Proceedings
While confined in the penitentiary on an escape charge, D was
sentenced to an additional ten-year period of confinement under
a recidivist proceeding. The recidivist information had been filed
at a time of a prior conviction for larceny and D had been con-
victed and sentenced under both. After completing the larceny
sentence, but while D was still in the penitentiary under the escape
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